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Since the 2001 anthrax attacks, public health officials have become concerned
with planning for a potential large scale attack. Researchers have worked to model
attack scenarios in order to evaluate various response policies. One response policy
that has been proposed is to preemptively distribute antibiotics to the public in the
form of MedKits before an attack occurs. Despite numerous models and studies,
there has not been a model to study the effect of distributing MedKits on the
expected number of deaths in an attack. We develop a discrete-time compartmental
difference equation model to analyze the policy. The results show that distributing
any number of MedKits reduces the number of deaths expected in all scenarios
tested. We analyze under what circumstances the MedKits have the largest life-
saving impact. We also develop a stochastic transition model to demonstrate the
accuracy of the MedKits model results.
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In recent years, the United States has become increasingly conscious of the
threat of terror attacks. In particular, significant attention has been given to bioter-
rorism. In September 2001, five people were killed and seventeen others were infected
after letters containing anthrax spores were mailed through the U.S. Postal Service
[9]. While deadly, this attack was relatively localized, mostly affecting those receiv-
ing the letters and the postal workers transporting them. An anthrax attack could
be realized on a much larger scale by the release of aerosolized spores in a large city.
In such a case, thousands of people could easily be exposed to this deadly disease.
Planning for a rapid response to such an attack is of great importance to various
government officials and the general public.
1.2 Anthrax: Symptoms and Treatment
The bacteria Bacillus anthracis causes the disease commonly known as an-
thrax. There are three ways in which anthrax can be transmitted. The most com-
mon is transmission through broken skin. Most often this occurs when a person
butchers an animal infected with anthrax. Anthrax contracted in this way is easily
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treated and rarely fatal. The second form of transmission is ingestion, when a person
eats infected meat. This form is relatively uncommon. The most dangerous form
of transmission is inhalation anthrax. A person needs to inhale merely 8,000-10,000
tiny (1-5µm in diameter) anthrax spores to become infected [5, 17]. It has been
reported that even just one kilogram of weapon-grade anthrax could be released
into the air and infect as many as 1.5 million people [2]. Without intervention, the
mortality rate would be extremely high.
There are three stages in anthrax disease progression. The first, incubation,
begins at infection. During incubation, the infected individual experiences no symp-
toms and will not know if he has been infected. The average incubation time is ap-
proximately 11 days [5]. From the incubation stage, an infected individual progresses
to the prodromal stage. The prodromal stage is characterized by non-headache neu-
rological symptoms such as fever, fatigue, and muscle aches similar to the flu. An
infected person next progresses to the fulminant stage, in which the individual is
very ill and experiencing respiratory distress. Generally, death occurs within days
of the emergence of symptoms.
Anthrax is most responsive to antibiotic treatments in its earliest stages. As
such, prophylaxis is an extremely important aspect of attack response. Prophylaxis
consists of an oral regimen of either ciproflaxin or doxycycline. A 60 day regimen
of prophylaxis medication is recommended to prevent illness. Those that begin pro-
phylaxis during the incubation stage and adhere to the entire 60 days of medication
will not become ill. However, those who begin taking medication but then stop may
progress to the prodromal and fulminant stages and possibly die.
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Treatment for those who have already become ill consists of three antibiotics
(rifampin, clindamycin, and either ciproflaxin or doxycycline). These drugs are
administered intravenously and require the patient to be in an intensive care unit
with access to ventilators, respiratory technicians, and the IV medications. Because
patients are hospitalized during treatment, their adherence rate is 100%. However,
not all patients recover even with treatment.
1.3 Priorities for Attack Response
The number one factor affecting the number of deaths resulting from an an-
thrax attack seems to be the speed of response. People who begin prophylaxis while
in the incubation stage have a significantly reduced risk of death. Even after be-
coming ill, those who receive treatment or prophylaxis earlier have a better chance
of survival.
Consequently, the priority of any response plan is to react as quickly as pos-
sible. There is research being conducted on ways to reduce the time between an
attack and when it is first detected and how to best inform the public of an attack.
The challenge with detection is that anthrax spores are colorless and odorless, so in
general, an attack is detected only when the first person becomes ill, which may be
days after the attack occurs. Many steps have also been implemented to minimize
the time between detection and when prophylaxis medication can be made available
to the public. This aspect of time reduction is the main focus of this thesis.
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1.4 Plans for Response
Currently, local governments primarily use Points of Dispensing (PODs) as a
means to distribute prophylaxis medication to the public. In the case of an attack,
upon detection (usually at least 1 or 2 days after the attack), a local government
can designate PODs in places such as school gymnasiums or community centers.
These places would allow for the public to come and receive a regimen of prophylaxis
medication. The dispensing capacity of PODs depends on the availability of workers
as well as medication. It is assumed that no matter what, the dispensing center will
need some time to build up to full dispensing capacity.
As soon as an attack is detected, local stockpiles of medication become imme-
diately available. The federal government maintains a national stockpile from which
it can send push packs of medication and ventilators to a local government within
12 hours of detection. There are also regional inventories called Vendor Managed
Inventory (VMI) which can send supplies within 36 hours of detecting an attack
[18].
In the early stages of distribution, the dispensing capacity is limited by the
sizes of the local stockpile and the federal push pack. Once the VMI arrives, the
supply is considered unlimited, and distribution is limited only by the rate that
the PODs can handle. The recommended prophylaxis regimen is 60 days. Often,
in order to provide prophylaxis to more people early, the PODs will distribute an
abbreviated regimen of just 14 days until the VMI becomes available. Those people
who received the shortened regimen must come back at a later time to receive the
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remainder of their medication. This can be done when the demand is much less
urgent [18].
There are other courses of action currently being considered with the goal of
reducing the time before members of the public can begin prophylaxis. The U.S.
Postal Service is investigating the possibility of delivering antibiotics directly to
homes. Another option being considered is community-based stockpiles of supplies
distributed to healthcare institutions before an event occurs. Similarly, pharmaceu-
ticals could be distributed to first responders to be kept on-hand in case of an attack.
Any combination of these and other measures could be implemented to better equip
communities to handle attacks [8].
1.5 MedKits
Another measure under consideration is the pre-attack placement of pharma-
ceuticals directly into households. This strategy is the focus of the work in this
thesis. The plan is to distribute prescription medication in the form of a kit called a
MedKit to some or all households prior to an attack. Recipients would be instructed
that the MedKit is for emergency use only and should not be opened except under
direction of government authorities.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) conducted a trial in
2006 with the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services to study such a
distribution. The study distributed a prototype MedKit to over 4,000 households
and randomly assigned each a time interval between two and eight months for a
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follow-up interview, during which they would return the kit. The results of the
study were very positive with 97% of participants returning their MedKits (99%
of those returned were intact). Of the 3% of households that did not return their
MedKits, 96% had lost theirs while the other 4% (5 households) refused to return
them. The study also looked at the participants’ attitudes towards the MedKits,
with a majority stating that they would like to have a MedKit to keep in their home
after participating in the study. Most would be willing to pay for the MedKit [8].
The main advantage to the MedKit strategy is that individuals with MedKits
could begin prophylaxis as soon as they become aware that an attack has occurred.
They would not have to wait for a POD to begin distributing medication and then
wait in line at the POD to receive the medication. As previously stated, time is
a priority in beginning prophylaxis, so MedKit distribution should have a positive
impact on the survival rate of an anthrax attack.
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the effect of pre-event distribution of
MedKits on the number of deaths that result from a large scale attack. We use
compartmental and simulation models to investigate different scenarios and obtain
estimates of the numbers of deaths in those scenarios.
1.6 Outline of Thesis
In Chap. 2, we present other models that have been implemented. We will
look at some research studies of anthrax as well as response policies. We will review
several compartmental and simulation models that have been designed for anthrax
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attack response. We will also look at a specific compartmental model that was
designed to evaluate various aspects of anthrax attack response and which is the
basis for the model used in this thesis.
In Chap. 3, we present the MedKits model, a compartmental model that ex-
tends one presented in Chap. 2. We discuss the differences between the two models
and give the details of the implementation.
In Chap. 4, a simulation model is presented to evaluate the accuracy of the
MedKits model. We look at the changes needed in order to stochastically simulate
an attack scenario.
In Chap. 5, we detail our findings. We give the results of the MedKits model
showing the effect of the MedKit distribution on the expected number of deaths. We
then present the results of the simulation and give our interpretation of the findings.
We also briefly discuss runtime results.




In this chapter we look at some of the work that has been done in anthrax
research. We also give an overview of applicable types of models and look at the
model we use as the basis of our MedKits model.
2.1 Anthrax Work
Since the 2001 anthrax attacks, public health officials and other researchers
have been seeking the best plans for response to a future attack in order to save
the maximum number of lives possible. Lindner provides a listing of practices for
consideration by individual districts [12]. Among the alternatives discussed are
traditional PODs, business PODs (in which businesses distribute medications to
their employees), postal delivery, and first responder stockpiles. The guide discusses
each method and some of the logistics involved. The guide also offers some advice
on choosing the best set of policies for a specific community.
Real data is essential to developing a good model. Without data, there is no
way to know what parameters are realistic in a model. Fortunately, there have not
been many incidences of anthrax outbreaks from which to draw data. As a result,
the majority of data used for all anthrax models comes from a handful of sources.
Brookmeyer and Blades compiled a comprehensive analysis of data in 2001 [5].
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They based their analysis on data collected during an outbreak in 1979 in Sverdlovsk,
Russia. In this case the source was not a terror attack but instead an accidental
release of anthrax spores. Studying the data in this case has provided many of the
commonly accepted characteristics of anthrax. For example, the mean length of the
incubation period is 10.95 days, a number used in many anthrax models.
Holty et al. considered an array of reported anthrax cases between 1900 and
2005 in order to evaluate the effect of age, gender, and treatment factors in patient
mortality. This provides a good source of data for models that include different
treatment plans [10].
Researchers have also conducted studies relating to individual emergency plans.
We are interested in data relating to MedKit distribution. The CDC’s Division of
Strategic National Stockpile studied the results and public opinions of such a plan in
2006-2007 in the St. Louis, Missouri, area. The goals of the study were to evaluate
the ability of households to maintain their MedKit as directed and collect public
opinions of the MedKits. The study included 4,076 households which were given
a home MedKit and assigned a recall time of two, four, or eight months. After
the assigned time period, the household was asked to return its MedKit and give a
follow-up interview.
The results of the study were very positive for MedKits [8]. 97% of respondents
returned their MedKits and 99% of these were intact and missing no pills. Only
a small number of households could not return their MedKits or reported having
taken the pills. 94% of participants said they would like to have MedKits in their
homes.
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Rinchiuso-Hasslemann and others conducted a series of discussion groups in
New York in 2008 to gather information about public feelings of mass prophylaxis
[14]. This study revealed the importance of disseminating information through a
reliable source. People are more willing to comply with guidance if it comes from
a source they trust. It also discovered the trend for people to wait to take their
prophylaxis until they see how others respond to it. Because beginning prophylaxis
quickly is urgent, this study suggests that more work should be done to encourage
higher adherence to prophylaxis.
All of these studies, as well as others, provide the data and direction for the
many anthrax attack models that have been and continue to be developed.
2.2 Modeling
Mathematical modeling is integral to studying how systems actually work.
With a good model, changes can be made and tested. This is particularly helpful in
cases where it is not desirable to actually study the system in question, which is the
case with anthrax attacks. Public health officials are very concerned with finding
response policies that would save as many lives as possible if an attack occurred,
and this requires studying how the policies affect the scenario. However, testing the
success of response policies by releasing anthrax spores in a city and observing what
happens is not the best option. Instead, creating mathematical models of attack
scenarios allows us to observe the effects of response plans safely. Mathematical
models can take on many forms depending on the system they are modeling.
10
One major decision that needs to be made for any model is whether it should
be agent based or differential equation based. Rahmandad and Sterman discuss the
pros and cons of both types of models [13]. An agent based model simulates each
actor in a model. For example, an anthrax model that simulated the disease stage
of each person in the population would be agent based. In contrast, compartmental
models treat the entire contents of a compartment as the same. In the anthrax
example, this would be consistent with considering all those in the incubation stage
together.
Agent based models allow for more accuracy because many subtleties can
be reflected in the model. These models allow for heterogeneity among those of
the same type in a model. The downside of agent based models is that they are
very computationally intensive and can often grow to be intractable even for simple
systems.
Models that consider entire groups together are naturally faster computation-
ally. These models involve compartments with transitions between them defined by
functions of the numbers in each compartment. While providing for better computa-
tion, these models do have limitations. Most notable is the homogeneous treatment
of members of a compartment.
Continuous advances in computer speed and capabilities make agent based
models more practical than ever before. However, they still incur time costs that
can be quite high. Because of the high numbers of people who can be affected by
an anthrax attack, an agent based model would still be very large. As a result, we
will focus on non-agent based models.
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2.2.1 Compartmental Modeling
Compartmental models are one of the most commonly used to model scenarios
in ecology, biomedicine, business and many other fields. Most compartmental mod-
els are intuitive representations of systems. The system to be modeled is partitioned
into homogeneous compartments. For example, a simple model of the spread of an
epidemic may consist of three compartments for those infected, those recovered (and
no longer susceptible), and those still susceptible to the infection.
The other needed component of the compartmental model is a definition of the
flow between compartments. Some common flows are constant, donor control, and
recipient control. In donor control, the flow from compartment i to j is generally
defined to be some function of the number in compartment i. The flow between
compartments i and j for recipient control is generally some function of the number
in compartment j. The flow equations can take many forms to realistically represent
the system in question. Compartmental models are ideal for theoretical analysis
and computer simulation. Walter and Contreras [15] provide a good introduction
to compartmental models and the theory behind them. A more detailed look at
compartmental model applications to medicine, including an in depth description of
many of the common forms of flow equations can be found in Jacquez [11].
In 2003, Wein et al. developed a model of an airborne anthrax attack in order
to compare response plans [16]. The model they developed included several compo-
nents. A Gaussian plume model was used to simulate the dispersion of the spores.
This helps to determine how many people will be infected in different locations rel-
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ative to the point of attack. The model also considers age as a factor of infection.
The disease stages are modeled as compartments with log-normal distributions for
transitions, and a 2-stage queueing system is used to model the waiting times for
the prophylaxis and treatment compartments.
To determine who will seek prophylaxis among those with no symptoms, the
model incorporates information about how many people in a certain area have de-
veloped symptoms. If the fraction of people at that location who have developed
symptoms (the anthrax burden) exceeds a set threshold, all people from that loca-
tion are placed in the queue for prophylaxis.
This model looks at prioritizing the antibiotics queue and the treatment queue.
For example, one policy considered is to give prophylaxis priority to those who are
already symptomatic, then to people over the age of 55 who are asymptomatic. The
simulations show that this prioritizing helps to decrease the number of deaths. The
model also considered different threshold values for the prophylaxis queue. p = 0
corresponds to the ideal situation in which every one receives prophylaxis regardless
of their exposure. If p = 1 (no one receives prophylaxis until they exhibit symptoms)
44% of those infected will die. Even just increasing p from 0 to 0.07 doubles the
death toll. The conclusions from this model underscore the importance of rapid
response and aggressive prophylaxis. They demonstrate that the way to obtain the
best outcome is to provide prophylaxis to all people in the affected area as soon as
possible, regardless of whether they have been infected.
Baccam and Boechler present another compartmental model of anthrax attacks
[1]. The goal of this model is to simulate and evaluate various response plans
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centering on an anthrax vaccination. The model consists of 11 compartments. There
are compartments for those people who are uninfected and those who are in the
incubation stage. There are two compartments for each of the early prodromal
stage, an intermediate stage, and the fulminant stage for those in treatment and
for those not in treatment. There are three end compartments for those who are
prophylaxed (moved from either uninfected or incubation) and never get sick, those
who recover after exhibiting symptoms and receiving treatment, and those who die.
The model assumes that everyone who reaches the fulminant stage will die.
This model considers people who have inhaled different amounts of spores and
thus have varying probabilities of becoming infected. There is also a graduated
adherence rate which says 10% of people who receive prophylactic antibiotics do
not take them, 15% take them for 15 days, 25% take them for each of 30 days,
45 days, and the full 60 day course. The model assumes a person’s likelihood of
becoming ill decreases the longer he continues to take his antibiotics, even if he does
not complete the entire course.
Baccam and Boechler compare four policies. All assume that the entire pop-
ulation receives the prophylaxis prescribed in the policy. The first is post-exposure
prophylaxis, the most commonly used policy now. The second policy combines post-
exposure prophylaxis with a two dose vaccine. The third adds a pre-exposure dose
of the vaccine to the post-exposure prophylaxis plan. The final policy combines all
three with a pre-exposure vaccine, post-exposure prophylaxis, and two more doses
of the vaccine. The policies involving the pre-exposure vaccine assume 50% of the
population was vaccinated before the attack.
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The model considers alternate parameter values to test its sensitivity. Scenar-
ios are designed to test the effectiveness of the policies and how they are influenced by
timing. The results for the first policy again show that if prophylaxis is distributed
earlier, even by a couple of days, a large percentage of deaths can be prevented.
The post-attack vaccines are most effective in saving the lives of those people who
choose not to take their prophylaxis antibiotics. The pre-attack vaccines also help
to save lives, particularly in scenarios where the prophylaxis distribution is slower.
Therefore, pre-attack vaccines act as a way to buy more time for detection and re-
sponse after an attack. The results of this model are generally consistent with the
findings of other models that time is one of the most important factors in saving
lives. The vaccines offer a measure to limit the detrimental effects of a delay.
Another compartmental model developed by Brandeau et al. uses a com-
partmental system to evaluate communication during a bioterror response [3]. The
model includes compartments for the disease stages. There are also compartments
for prophylaxis and treatment, as well as queues for both. The way asymptomatic
people become aware of an attack is through public health and emergency response
officials as well as the media. The model seeks to demonstrate the effects of commu-
nication policies. The authors have targeted aspects of the response scenario that
directly relate to the number of deaths expected and developed communication plans
to address these issues. The model is used to evaluate communication policies that
affect the rate people become aware of the attack and the rate they seek prophylaxis
and treatment. The authors also consider ways to decrease the fraction of people
not exposed who seek prophylaxis as this has an adverse affect on those who have
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been affected when the supply of prophylaxis is limited. They model the results of
attempts to better direct people to specific PODs in order to reduce overcrowding
at some PODs. They also look at the results of increasing prophylaxis adherence
and the dispensing rate.
The model considers a variety of values for each of the relevant parameters
to evaluate the effect each policy has on the mortality rate. As expected, the mor-
tality rate declines with shorter detection time, faster rates of people seeking pro-
phylaxis, limited numbers of unexposed seeking prophylaxis, equal distribution of
those seeking prophylaxis among the PODs, better adherence rates, and increased
distribution capacity. The paper provides practical communications strategies to
accomplish these and the model provides evidence that they will in fact improve the
outcome of the response policy in an attack.
Another compartmental model is presented by Bravata and Zaric [4, 18]. We
will discuss the details of this model in Section 2.3.
2.2.2 Stochastic Modeling
Stochastic modeling allows systems to be modeled using random variables to
give a distribution of likely results for a scenario. This can be useful alone as a way
of evaluating the effects of uncertain parameters, or it can be used in conjunction
with another model as a means of comparison to assess the accuracy of results.
Buckeridge uses stochastic modeling to evaluate detection of an attack [6].
Because detecting an attack earlier can save many lives, researchers are developing
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syndromic surveillance systems to detect attacks as soon as possible. One such
system is the BioSense system which gathers data on outpatient visits, laboratory
orders, and prescriptions so that if there is a small increase in anthrax (or potentially
other disease) indicators, an attack can be detected earlier than if officials wait to
see seriously ill people being admitted to hospitals. Because these indicators occur
randomly, the model must find a way to simulate them as random variables.
The model uses a Latin hypercube sampling approach to generate parameter
values for the model. For each parameter (like the probability of an outpatient visit
in the prodromal state or the time until blood culture growth), there are three equal
probability bins. There is a small bin centered around the mean, and two larger
bins on either side. Each of the healthcare parameters is distributed as either a
Bernoulli or exponential random variable. The duration of the disease stages are
also randomized with lognormal distributions.
The results of the simulation model were compared with clinical case stud-
ies of detection of actual outbreaks. The model study showed there is a careful
balance between the specificity of syndromic surveillance and the sensitivity of the
surveillance system. If the indicator levels that trigger a warning are too specific,
there will be a high incidence of false alarms, which is undesirable. However, as this
specificity is decreased, the surveillance system does not successfully detect all of the
simulated attacks earlier than the clinical detection. The stochastic model allows
data on the number of times the surveillance model detects an attack before the
clinical detection. A deterministic model would only be able to provide an expected
time of detection for the surveillance system.
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2.3 A Compartmental Model of Anthrax Response
The model that we will use as a basis for our models is presented in Bravata
et al. [4] and expanded upon in Zaric et al. [18]. The model is similar to the
model described in Brandeau et al. [3]. This model is a compartmental model used
to evaluate how different parameters affect the overall mortality rate in an attack
scenario.
The model is run with a population of 5,000,000 people. The number of
exposed individuals as well as the fraction of those not exposed who believe they were
are given as input parameters. Also, the prophylaxis adherence rate and the arrival
time of the push pack are input parameters. The model consists of 21 compartments
representing the stages of the disease as well as the stages of treatment. There
are compartments for those people who were unexposed and considered uninvolved
in the scenario as well as compartments for those people who were not exposed
but believe they were. The compartments are categorized by two statuses. Each
compartment is representative of a disease stage (incubation, prodromal, fulminant,
recovered, dead, not exposed) and an awareness/treatment stage (unaware, aware
and seeking prophylaxis, in prophylaxis, seeking treatment, and in treatment). The
flows between compartments are dictated by probabilities taken from Holty et al.
[10] and Brookmeyer and Blades [5].
The simulation is run over a 2400 hour time horizon and in each iteration
of time t, the model calculates the number that will transition between each pair
of compartments (i, j) as φij(t). At the end of each iteration, the number in each
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compartment i is updated using this difference equation







where δi is the death rate from compartment i.
The model is run over a variety of scenarios. The results confirm expected
outcomes. If the attack detection is later or prophylaxis supplies are delayed in
becoming available, the number of deaths increases. Increasing the numbers held in
the local stockpile decreases the number of deaths, as does increasing the dispensing
capacity. The model also considers distributing only an abbreviated regimen of
prophylaxis while the supplies are initially quite limited. If only 14-day regimens
are distributed (with the assumption that these people will later return to pick up
the remainder of their pills), prophylaxis can be distributed to a much larger number
of people and the number of deaths will decrease. The results also demonstrated that
the adherence rate to prophylaxis is a major contributor to saving lives. Increasing
the adherence rate from 65% to 90% decreases the number of deaths by about 13.7%
in the scenario tested. The model also revealed that the number of unexposed people
seeking prophylaxis directly affected the expected number of deaths. If more people
who do not need it seek prophylaxis, it prevents those who do need it from acquiring
it as quickly.
The creators of this model also look at some cost analysis in their report. They
present the cost of the various antibiotics used for prophylaxis and treatment. They
also quantify the number of life years lost in an attack based on the average life
years lost by a patient who dies (43.4 years). With these they can calculate the cost
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per life year of the response scenario.
The model does have limitations and some confusing details that we will clar-
ify and improve. The model does not contain a compartment for death but instead
eliminates people from the model when they die. While this is a reflection of re-
ality in that people do leave the population upon death, it is not a truly closed
system. There is also some confusion about how multiple transitions from the same
compartment in the same iteration are handled to ensure people are moved as they
should be. The rate of adherence to prophylaxis is incorporated unclearly in a way
that those that have been entirely adherent seem to still be susceptible to illness.
In the next chapter, we develop a compartmental model which expands upon
this model to improve the issues above and provide for our study of the effect of
MedKit distribution.
2.4 Discussion
There are models of the progression of anthrax that are based on data analysis.
These models have focused on the spread of anthrax spores after an attack and the
distributions of times spent in the disease stages.
Other models have incorporated dispersion and disease progression models to
evaluate various attack response plans. There are compartmental models as well
as stochastic simulation models that have examined how communication policies,
timing, and prophylaxis, treatment, and vaccines affect the number of deaths in an
attack scenario. Many of these models share similar conclusions. All conclude that
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time is one of the most influential factors. This has guided researchers to focus on
policies which reduce response time either by decreasing the time until detection or
decreasing the time to organize and respond once an attack has been detected.
Additional research has been conducted on the feasibility of distributing Med-
Kits prior to an attack to help decrease the time before prophylaxis can begin.
Studies have collected data on public opinion as well as the likelihood that people
would still be able to use their MedKits in the event of an attack.
No one has yet developed a model to study the effects of the MedKits on the
number of deaths in an attack. This idea is the inspiration for the work in this thesis.
We will extend the model presented by Zaric [18] and use MedKit data gathered by
the CDC [8] to develop a model to evaluate attack scenarios with MedKit policies.
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Chapter 3
The MedKits Compartmental Model
3.1 Extending the Model
In order to evaluate the effect of MedKit distribution on the number of ex-
pected deaths in an attack scenario, we began with the model described in the
previous chapter presented by Zaric et al. [18]. The original model consists of 21
compartments representing the stages of disease progression and treatment. Transi-
tions between compartments are governed by equations dependent on the probability
that a person progresses from compartment A to compartment B in a given hour.
We keep the compartmental structure of that model and calculate many of the tran-
sition equations in the same way. Like the original model, our new MedKits model
is a discrete-time model that simulates a 2400-hour time horizon.
There are some limitations to the original model which we have addressed for
the MedKits model. The original model does not represent a closed system. After
people become ill, they either recover or die. The model contains a compartment for
those people who recover, but people who die are simply removed from the model.
This reflects what happens in reality when people die and are removed from the
population. However, a better compartmental model should have the same number
of agents at the end of simulation as it had at the beginning.
Also, the model contains a compartment for those people in the incubation
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stage who are receiving prophylaxis. Each hour the probability of progressing in
illness is calculated considering the probability of becoming prodromal times 1−α,
(the probability of not adhering to prophylaxis). This gives the impression that a
person could not adhere in one hour and then become adherent again in the next. In
actuality, it should be a one time decision whether a person will adhere completely
or not.
The model is also not completely precise about how to handle people who can
progress both in disease stage and treatment stage in the same hour. We address
each of these issues in the MedKits model.
The MedKits model includes a compartment for death, as well as separate
compartments for those in prophylaxis who are adherent and those who are not.
We prioritize transitions and create a two-stage iteration so that those transitions
relating to disease progression, death, and recovery are handled first. To extend the
model to include people who have MedKits in their homes, we add new compart-
ments to the model and change transitions where necessary to reflect how people
move between the new set of compartments. In the following sections we will discuss
the details of the MedKits Model.
3.2 The Compartments
Our MedKits model contains 28 compartments in all. From this point, we will
refer to the compartments by the disease and treatment stages they represent or by
their numbers as appropriate.
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Initially, everyone is unaware that an attack has occurred. Each individual
is either exposed or not exposed. Individuals who have been exposed to the an-
thrax spores are in the incubation stage and have the potential to progress to the
prodromal and fulminant stages as well as death. As these people become aware
of the attack and their potential exposure, they will seek prophylaxis, and as they
become ill, they will seek treatment. Because there are dispensing capacities for
both prophylaxis and for treatment, these people may have to wait in a queue prior
to receiving the medication.
Those not exposed are broken into two subgroups: those who know they were
not exposed and those who think they may have been exposed. People who know
they are not exposed will never seek prophylaxis or treatment and cannot become
ill, so these people remain in the same not exposed compartment for the duration of
the simulation. The people who believe they may have been exposed, but actually
were not, cannot become ill but will seek prophylaxis as they become aware of the
attack. They will enter the same queue as those people who have been exposed to
wait for prophylaxis. However, because they cannot become ill, this is modeled by
separate compartments without flow to the next disease stage.
When a person becomes ill, his probability of becoming more ill or dying
depends partially on how early prophylaxis was started. As a result those in pro-
phylaxis during the prodromal stage are broken into two compartments depending
on if the prophylaxis began in the incubation stage or the prodromal stage. Like-
wise, those in the fulminant stage are broken into multiple compartment based on
when they began prophylaxis and if or when they began treatment.
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In our compartmental model, at every iteration, each individual is in exactly
one compartment. So for example, if a scenario begins with 100 people, after each
iteration of the model, the people will move between compartments, but the sum
of the numbers in each compartment will always be 100. This way, we ensure that
no one is lost, and we only need to count the number in compartment 22 (the
compartment for death) at the end of the simulation to know how many people
died.
Just like the rest of the population, people with MedKits all begin unaware of
the attack and are either exposed or not exposed. Those who know they have not
been exposed are no different than those without MedKits who know they are not at
risk. Therefore, we place these people in the same compartment we already have for
unexposed individuals. Those who were not exposed but think they may have been
will begin taking their MedKit as soon as they become aware of an attack, but they
can never become ill and will not join the queue for prophylaxis. Instead they move
into another new compartment for taking their MedKits, and they remain here for
the rest of the simulation.
We have a compartment corresponding to each disease stage for those people
who have MedKits and are unaware of the attack. These people are not yet taking
their MedKits because they do not yet know they should. Once they become aware
that an attack has occurred and that they are at risk, they begin taking their
MedKits and enter the existing compartments for those receiving prophylaxis. The
main difference between these people and those who began unaware and did not
have MedKits is that these people skip over the compartment for the prophylaxis
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queue. Altogether, there are five new compartments for the people who receive
MedKits prior to an attack.
We add one more compartment to our model to make more precise the tran-
sition to prophylaxis in the incubation stage. People who begin prophylaxis have
some probability α of adhering to it, in which case they cannot become ill. However
if they do not adhere to prophylaxis for the full 60-day regimen, they have a chance
of progressing to the prodromal disease stage. We make the decision of whether
each person will adhere as soon as that person begins prophylaxis. We create two
separate compartments for people in prophylaxis. Compartment 7 is only for people
who do not adhere fully, and compartment 28 is for those who will adhere fully. The
number beginning prophylaxis times α gives the number moving into compartment
28. These people can not become ill, so they remain in this compartment for the re-
mainder of the simulation. The rest of the people beginning prophylaxis are placed
in compartment 7, and it is assumed that they will not adhere to their prophylaxis
and therefore, can become ill.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 list all of the compartments and what disease stage and
treatment stage they represent.
3.3 Model Assumptions
The MedKits model follows the timeline described below which is based on
the scenarios described in [18]. The details of the timeline, as well as the capacities
described could be adjusted to reflect different scenarios. For example, we assume
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Table 3.1: List of compartments.
Number Exposure, Progression Treatment MedKit
Treatment Status of Disease Began
1 Exposed, Incubation n.a. No
unaware
2 Exposed, Prodromal n.a. No
unaware
3 Exposed, Fulminant n.a. No
unaware
4 Aware of Incubation n.a. No
exposure
5 Aware of Prodromal n.a. No
exposure
6 Aware of Fulminant n.a. No
exposure
7 In Prophylaxis, Incubation Prophylaxis begun Both
not adherent in incubation
8 In Prophylaxis Prodromal Prophylaxis begun Both
in incubation
9 In Prophylaxis Prodromal Prophylaxis begun Both
in prodromal
10 In Prophylaxis Fulminant Prophylaxis begun Both
in incubation
11 In Prophylaxis Fulminant Prophylaxis begun Both
in prodromal
12 In Prophylaxis Fulminant Prophylaxis begun Both
in fulminant
13 In Treatment Prodromal Treatment begun Both
in prodromal
14 In Treatment Fulminant Prophylaxis or Treatment Both
begun in prodromal
15 In Treatment Fulminant Prophylaxis - incubation, Both
treatment - fulminant
16 In Treatment Fulminant Prophylaxis - none or Both
begun in fulminant
17 Exposed Recovered n.a. Both
18 Not Exposed n.a. n.a. Both
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Table 3.2: Continuation of Table 3.1
Number Exposure, Progression Treatment MedKit
Treatment Status of Disease Began
19 Potential exposure, n.a. n.a. No
not seeking
prophylaxis
20 Potential exposure, n.a. n.a. No
seeking prophylaxis
21 Potential exposure, n.a. n.a. No
in prophylaxis
22 Exposed Dead n.a. Both
23 Potential exposure, n.a. n.a. Yes
not seeking
prophylaxis
24 Potential exposure, n.a. n.a. Yes
in prophylaxis
25 Exposed, unaware Incubation n.a. Yes
26 Exposed, unaware Prodromal n.a. Yes
27 Exposed, unaware Fulminant n.a. Yes
28 Adhering to Prophylaxed Prophylaxis begun Both
prophylaxis in incubation
the attack is detected after 48 hours. However, if new research provides a way to
detect an attack earlier, the timeline could be changed to model the new scenario.
3.3.1 Timeline
We consider a time period of 100 days for this model, so we simulate the model
over t = 1, ..., 2400. We assume t = 0 is the time of the attack. The attack is detected
at t = 48 hours. It takes five hours to prepare the local stockpile for distribution,
so medication and intravenous antibiotics (IVs) from this source become available
at t = 53 hours. The push pack from the national stockpile arrives 12 or 24 hours
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after detection and requires another four hours to prepare for distribution. So more
IVs, ventilators, and antibiotics become available at t = 64 or t = 76 hours. VMI
becomes available 36 hours after detection at t = 84 hours. At this point we no
longer have capacity restrictions based on availability of antibiotics and IVs. The
VMI is assumed to be sufficient to meet all needs. We assume it takes 48 hours for
the PODs to reach full dispensing capacity, which occurs at time t = 96 hours.
3.3.2 Resource Capacities
We assume that each dispensing center operates for 14 hours per day and,
at full capacity, can dispense 1,000 doses per hour during that time. We assume
there are a total of 10 PODs, for a total of 10,000 doses per hour over 14 hours per
day. To simplify the model slightly, we recalculate the doses per hour spread out
over 24 hours per day. This means at full capacity, the entire collection of PODs
can dispense 5,833 doses per hour. We assume that the dispensing capacity begins
at 0 at time t = 48 hours (time of detection which we will call TD) and increases
linearly over the next 48 hours to reach full capacity, Dmax, at t = 96 hours. So the
dispensing capacity at time t is as follows:
D(t) = 0, t < TD (3.1)
D(t) = [(t− TD)/48] ∗Dmax, TD < t < 48 + TD (3.2)
D(t) = Dmax, t > 48 + TD (3.3)
This is, of course, the rate at which PODs could dispense antibiotics assuming
they had sufficient inventory. The rate is also restricted by the level of inventory in
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the local stockpile and the push pack.
Until the VMI becomes available, the PODs dispense only an abbreviated
prophylaxis regimen of 14 days, rather than the full 60-day supply. This allows the
limited supply to be spread to more people when they really need it. It is assumed
that those who receive only the 14-day regimen will return later, when demand is
not so urgent, to receive the remainder of their regimen. We assume that the local
stockpile contains 50,000 doses or 3,571 abbreviated regimens. When the push pack
arrives, it contains an additional 2,718,000 doses or 194,143 abbreviated regimens.
The VMI is assumed to contain enough doses for everyone to receive the full 60-day
regimen.
Treatment capacity is also controlled by the availability of the supplies needed
for treatment. Treatment requires IV antibiotics, ventilators, respiratory techni-
cians, and ICU beds. The IV antibiotics are described in terms of days. Each
person in treatment requires one day of IV medication for each day of treatment.
There must be at least one day of IV medication available to begin treating one
person. We assume the local stockpile contains 500 days of IV antibiotics, the push
pack provides an additional 21,492 days, and the VMI contains enough IV antibi-
otics for all who need them. There are 100 ventilators available at the time of attack
and 100 more arrive in the push pack. There are 200 respiratory technicians and
each can monitor 10 patients. There are 2,000 ICU beds available. At the begin-
ning, treatment capacity is slowed by the limited availability of IV antibiotics. Once
the VMI becomes available, there are enough IVs for everyone, and the number of
ventilators becomes the slowing factor.
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3.4 Calculating the Number in Each Compartment
Initially, people can be in only compartments 1, 18, 19, 23, or 25. Xi(t) is the
number of people in compartment i at time t. We say that P is the total population
size, N is the number of people exposed to the anthrax spores, M is the number of
people who received MedKits prior to the attack, pM is the probability that they
still have their MedKits and can use them (assumed to be 95% [8]), and β is the
probability that a person not exposed believes he or she was exposed. The initial
numbers in each compartment are as follows
X1(0) = (P − pMM)N/P, (3.4)
X18(0) = (1− β)(P −N), (3.5)
X19(0) = β(P − pMM)(1−N/P ), (3.6)
X23(0) = βpMM(1−N/P ), (3.7)
X25(0) = pMMN/P, (3.8)
Xi(0) = 0, for i=2,..., 17, 20..., 22, 24, and 26,..., 28. (3.9)
The model is completely dependent on a set of equations defining the tran-
sitions between compartments. These equations describe the expected number of
people who will move between a pair of compartments at time t based on the prob-
ability of moving from one state to the other. In the original model, for each pair
of compartments, φij(t) gives the number of people who move from compartment i
to compartment j at hour t. The number of people in compartment i at time t+ 1
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is calculated using the following difference equation







This equation leads to some confusion as a person could progress in both dis-
ease and treatment status in the same hour. For example, a person in the incubation
stage waiting in the queue for prophylaxis could simultaneously move into prophy-
laxis and become prodromal. We account for this type of situation by calculating
the transitions in two steps. First, we calculate all transitions relating to disease
progression. We update the number of people in each compartment. Then we cal-
culate the transitions relating to awareness and treatment status and update the
number in each compartment again. In this model, φij(t) is the number of people
who move from compartment i to compartment j at time t due to illness, recovery
or death, and ψij(t) is the number of people who move due to awareness, prophy-
laxis, or treatment. We use these two separate difference equations to calculate the
number of people, Xi(t+ 1) in compartment i at time t+ 1,















Because the transitions between compartments represent actual possibilities,
not every pair of compartments can have people move between them. For exam-
ple, someone in the incubation stage will not die from anthrax without progressing
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Figure 3.1: This figure shows the possible flows between all compartments in the














through the prodromal and fulminant stages first. Also, reverse transitions are pro-
hibited, e.g. aware to unaware. For these pairs of compartments, the probability
of transition is zero. The following sections will define all of the nonzero transition
equations. Fig. 3.1 shows all of the possible flows between compartments in the
model.
As stated previously, there are two types of transitions. The first is transitions
relating to disease progression, recovery, or death. The second type is transitions
relating to awareness, prophylaxis, or treatment status. We give priority to the first
type of transitions in our model (these are the transitions we denote by φij(t)). At
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each iteration, we calculate all of the first transitions and move people to their new
compartments, then we calculate the second set of transitions (ψij(t)) and move
people again.
3.5.1 Progression from Incubation to Prodromal
The distribution for the incubation time is commonly calculated in the fol-
lowing way [18, 16]. The probability of becoming prodromal is p(t) = (F (t + 1) −
F (t))/(1 − F (t)), where F (t) is the cumulative distribution function of incubation
time distributed lognormally with mean 10.95 days, and 2.1392 and 0.713 are the
mean and standard deviation respectively of the variable’s natural logarithm [5]. So
the transition equations for moving from incubation to prodromal are of the form
φi,i+1(t) = p(t)Xi(t), for i = 1, 4, 7, and 25. (3.13)
3.5.2 Progression from Prodromal to Fulminant
The rate of becoming fulminant is dependent on the length of time a person
has been prodromal. Without prophylaxis or treatment, in the first three days
after symptoms develop, the rate of progression from prodromal to fulminant is
γ = 0.0026. After the first three days of symptoms, the rate of progression from
prodromal to fulminant rises to η = 0.0181 [10]. We keep a counter and calculate
θ2(t), θ5(t), and θ26(t) to be the fraction of those in compartments 2, 5, and 26







So at time t, the fraction of people in the prodromal stage without prophylaxis
or treatment who will become fulminant is calculated as θiγ + (1 − θi)η and the
transition equations are
φi,i+1(t) = (θiγ + (1− θi)η)Xi(t), for i = 2, 5, and 26. (3.15)
For those receiving prophylaxis or treatment, the expected time to become
fulminant is 122.4 hours, so the probability of becoming fulminant each hour is
calculated to be 1/122.4 [18, 10]. These transition equations are
φi,j(t) = (1/122.4)Xi(t), for (i,j) pairs (8,10), (9,11), and (13,14). (3.16)
3.5.3 Progression to Recovery and Death
Patients in the prodromal or fulminant stages can recover from anthrax if they
are receiving treatment. For each compartment there is a probability of recovery,
and the number moved from that compartment to compartment 17 (recovered) each
hour is the number in the compartment multiplied by the probability of recovery.
We use the recovery rates presented in [18]. So we have the following transition
equations
φj,17 = Xj(t)/21.7, for j = 8, 9, and 13, (3.17)
φj,17 = Xj(t)/720, for j = 14, 15, and 16. (3.18)
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Only patients in the fulminant stage can die from the disease. The death rate
from all other compartments is zero. Each compartment representing a fulminant
stage has a probability of death [18], and the number moved each hour from that
compartment to death is calculated in the same way that the number recovered is
calculated. The transition equations are
φi,22(t) = (1/26.4)Xi(t), for i = 3, 6, 10, 11, and 27, (3.19)
φi,22(t) = (1/38.4)Xi(t), for i = 12 and 16, (3.20)
φi,22(t) = (1/24)Xi(t), for i = 14 and 15. (3.21)
Table 3.3 gives the probabilities of all possible transitions because of illness, recovery,
or death.
3.5.4 Awareness of Exposure
We assume a constant rate at which people become aware of their exposure or
potential exposure. We use the awareness rates used by Zaric et al. [18]. For those
people not showing symptoms and those in the prodromal stage, the probability of
becoming aware is 1/3 each day or 1/72 each hour. For those people already in the
fulminant stage, the probability of becoming aware is 1/2 each day or 1/48 each
hour. These probabilities give the following transitions equations for moving from
unaware (compartments 1, 2, 19, and 3) to aware (compartments 4, 5, 20, and 6
respectively);
ψ1,4 = (1/72)Y1(t), (3.22)
ψ2,5 = (1/72)Y2(t), (3.23)
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Table 3.3: Fraction of each compartment that becomes ill, dies, or recovers each
hour.
Compartment Becomes prodromal Becomes fulminant Dies Recovers
1 p(t)
2 θ2γ + (1− θ2)η
3 1/26.4
4 p(t)













26 θ26γ + (1− θ26)η
27 1/26.4
ψ3,6 = (1/48)Y3(t), (3.24)
ψ19,20 = (1/72)Y19(t). (3.25)
(3.26)
We assume those with MedKits have the same awareness rates as those with-
out. The probabilities of moving from compartments 25, 26, 23, and 27 to the
awareness states are the same as above.
ψ23,24 = (1/72)Y23(t), (3.27)
ψ26,9 = (1/72)Y26(t), (3.28)
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ψ27,12 = (1/48)Y27(t). (3.29)
The probability of moving from compartment 25 to a state of awareness and pro-
phylaxis in a given hour is also 1/72; however, this compartment splits transitions
between two prophylaxis compartments. This transition will be discussed in the
following section.
3.5.5 Entering into Prophylaxis and Treatment
For those people with MedKits, entering into prophylaxis occurs at the time of
awareness. So transitions from compartments 26 to 5, 27 to 6, and 23 to 24 occur at
the rate of becoming aware for those compartments. From compartment 25, people
also move into prophylaxis at the awareness rate of 1/72 per hour. However from
this point we decide if each person will be adherent to the full course of prophylaxis
(and move into compartment 28) or if they will not adhere (moving to compartment
7) and be at risk of progressing to the prodromal stage. We calculate the number
who move from compartment 25 to 28 and 7 respectively as
ψ25,28(t) = α(1/72)Y28(t), (3.30)
ψ25,7(t) = (1− α)(1/72)Y28(t). (3.31)
for all t ≥ TD.
People without MedKits move into a queue for prophylaxis when they be-
come aware of their exposure or potential exposure. From this queue, the number
of people who can be given prophylaxis in an hour is limited by the capacity de-
scribed in section 3.3.2. This capacity is spread across all compartments waiting
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for prophylaxis to calculate the probability of moving from any one of them into
prophylaxis. Likewise, treatment capacity must be spread across all compartments
waiting for treatment to determine the probability of moving into treatment from
any compartment.
Those in compartments 5 and 6 are considered to be in both the queue for
treatment and the queue for prophylaxis because they have already developed symp-
toms but have not received any prophylaxis. Obviously they would take treatment
over prophylaxis since they have already become ill. So we calculate those moving
to treatment first. If they do not move into treatment, then they would continue to
seek prophylaxis that hour.
We first calculate the number of people who will move into treatment at time
t based on the availability of IV antibiotics (IV (t)), ventilators (V (t)), respiratory
technicians (T (t)), beds (B(t)) and the number of people waiting for treatment (even
if the capacity is higher, there will not be more people moved to treatment than are
waiting for it). The number of people currently in treatment is
∑16
i=13 Yi(t), so the
available number of materials is the number of materials not expected to be used
by those people. People in compartments 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 are all waiting
for treatment. The number who will be treated, CT (t) is calculated as











So the probability of moving to treatment from any one compartment is








So we calculate the following transitions to treatment
ψ5,13(t) = π(t)Y5(t), (3.34)
ψ6,16(t) = π(t)Y6(t), (3.35)
ψ8,13(t) = π(t)Y8(t), (3.36)
ψ9,13(t) = π(t)Y9(t), (3.37)
ψ10,15(t) = π(t)Y10(t), (3.38)
ψ11,14(t) = π(t)Y11(t), (3.39)
ψ12,16(t) = π(t)Y12(t). (3.40)
After the people who have been moved to treatment are removed from com-
partments 5 and 6, we calculate the transitions into prophylaxis. We let the available
inventory of prophylactic antibiotics at time t be I(t). The number of doses dis-
pensed to each person at time t (i.e. 14 or 60 depending on availability) is denoted
d(t). The dispensing capacity per hour of the PODs (not considering availability
of medication) is denoted by D(t). The number of people waiting for prophylaxis
at time t is Lq(t) = Y4(t)Y20(t) + (1 − π(t))(Y5(t) + Y6(t)). Each hour we calculate
CP (t), the number of people who will begin prophylaxis in that hour, by
CP (t) = min{I(t)/d(t), D(t), Lq(t)}. (3.41)
We use this number to calculate the probability of moving from each of compart-
ments 4, 5, 6, and 20 into prophylaxis by
ρ(t) = CP (t)/Lq(t). (3.42)
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And with this we calculate the transitions into prophylaxis
ψ4,7(t) = (1− α)ρ(t)Y4(t), (3.43)
ψ4,28(t) = (α)ρ(t)Y4(t), (3.44)
ψ5,9(t) = ρ(t)(1− π(t))Y5(t), (3.45)
ψ6,12(t) = ρ(t)(1− π(t))Y6(t), (3.46)
ψ20,21(t) = ρ(t)Y20(t). (3.47)
3.6 Updating the Inventory Levels
After each iteration, we must recalculate the available supplies. The number
of beds and respiratory technicians is assumed constant throughout the simulation,
so for all t, we have
B(t+ 1) = B(t), (3.48)
T (t+ 1) = T (t). (3.49)
We say tL is the time lag before local inventories become available (assumed
to be 5 hours in our model), tP is the time before the push pack arrives (12 or
24 hours), tPR is the time lag after arrival before the push pack is ready to use (4
hours), and tV is the time until the VMI becomes available (36 hours). IL and IVL
are the local supply of antibiotics and IVs respectively. IP , IVP , and VP are the
additional supply of antibiotics, IVs, and ventilators contained in the push pack.
We update the supplies in the following manner: If t = TD + tL,
I(t+ 1) = I(t)− CP (t)d(t) + IL, (3.50)
41
IV (t+ 1) = IV (t)−
16∑
j=13
Xj(t) + IVL, (3.51)
V (t+ 1) = V (t). (3.52)
If t = TD + tP + tPR,
I(t+ 1) = I(t)− CP (t)d(t) + IP , (3.53)
IV (t+ 1) = IV (t)−
16∑
j=13
Xj(t) + IVP , (3.54)
V (t+ 1) = V (t) + VP . (3.55)
The VMI provides enough antibiotics and IVs for everyone in the population P , so
for at t = TD + tV , we have
I(t+ 1) = I(t)− CP (t)d(t) + IL, (3.56)
I(t+ 1) = I(t)− CP (t)d(t) + 60P, (3.57)
IV (t+ 1) = IV (t)−
16∑
j=13
Xj(t) + 3000P, (3.58)
V (t+ 1) = V (t). (3.59)
For all other times when no new inventory is added, we have
I(t+ 1) = I(t)− CP (t)d(t), (3.60)








The MedKits model gives a completely deterministic view of the attack sce-
nario. It moves people between compartments strictly based on the probability that
they should move. If one in ten people should move from compartment 1 to com-
partment 2 this hour, then one in ten of those people will move. However, this is
not the way things work in reality. Perhaps this hour only one in twelve people
will get sick, but in the next hour, one in eight will. There can be a substantial
difference between an expected value and a random realization of a scenario. It is
this uncertainty that we are concerned about in this chapter. It would be beneficial
to know how accurate the results of the MedKits model are in an uncertain world.
How do the results vary if the compartment transitions are random? Will we still
see the same trends in the data? To answer these questions we develop a simulation
model to test the accuracy of the MedKits model results.
4.1 Model Overview
Two styles of simulation could be used in this model. The first is an agent-
based model, in which each individual’s path through the compartments would be
simulated. We consider person 1 who begins in compartment 1, and has certain
probabilities of moving to compartment 2 or compartment 4. We stochastically
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decide if and where he moves. We do this for each person in the model for each
hour of simulation. This would theoretically provide a very realistic representation.
However, due to the large populations we consider and the number of time periods
used in the model, this type of simulation is impractical and perhaps infeasible.
Instead we consider a simulation model in which we treat the compartments
as wholes. For each compartment, in each hour, we model as a random variable the
number who will move from that compartment to another. The overall structure of
the model is the same as the MedKit model. We use the same 28 compartments,
and the set of possible transitions is the same. We run the model over a 2400-hour
time horizon. In each hour, the model samples the appropriate random variables,
calculates the number moved for each transition, and moves people using equations
3.11 and 3.12. The prophylaxis antibiotics and treatment supplies are all available
in the same quantities at the same times, and they are updated each hour in the
same way as in the MedKits model.
4.2 Changes to the Model
Each person in a compartment has the same probability of making a transi-
tion. The transition of that individual can be represented with a Bernoulli random
variable. A positive result means the individual moves, and a negative result means
he does not. Thus, the transitions of the entire compartment can be modeled as a
binomial random variable with parameters n and p, where n is the number of people
in the compartment and p is the probability of the transition. All of the transitions
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relating to disease progression, recovery, death, and awareness are controlled by
probabilities and can be modeled with binomial random variables.
The transitions to prophylaxis and treatment depend upon the availability of
antibiotics and supplies. These transitions are not made randomly in the same way
as the others. We assume that people cannot enter prophylaxis or treatment if the
supplies are not available to them. But if there are people waiting, and the supplies
become available, people will certainly transition into prophylaxis or treatment up
to capacity.
A binomial random variable requires an integer for the parameter n, as it
represents a number of trials. One of the biggest changes to the model is ensuring
that all compartments contain an integer number of people at all times so that we
are able to calculate binomial random variables for the appropriate transitions. This
begins with reformulating the initial conditions to produce only integer compartment
values at the start of our simulation.
4.2.1 Initial Conditions
As described in Section 3.4, P is the population size, N is the number of
people exposed to the anthrax, M is the number of MedKits distributed, pM is
the 95% of those with MedKits that are able to find and use them, and β is the
fraction of unexposed people who believe they have been exposed. We initially place
people only in compartments 1, 18, 19, 23, and 25. We would like to place integer
numbers of people in these compartments while still nearly approximating the ratios
45
determined by the input parameters. Instead of using the equations given in Section
3.4, we calculate the numbers in the compartments in the following manner.
Because they represent people, we assume the input parameters P and N are
integers. We know the total number not exposed is P − N . We must break this
group into those who know they were not exposed and those who believe they were.
We first calculate a rounded number that know they were not exposed by
X18(0) = round[(P −N)(1− β)]. (4.1)
So we now assume P −N −X18(0) is the total number who have not been exposed
but think they have been. These people are broken into two compartments based
on whether they have a MedKit. We calculate the number with MedKits who think




(P −N −X18(0))]. (4.2)
Since both of the above groups have been rounded to the nearest whole number,
we calculate the number who believe they have been exposed and do not have a
MedKit as the difference
X19(0) = P −N −X18(0)−X23(0). (4.3)
Similarly, we know that N is the number of people exposed, and they are







Then we simply calculate the number without MedKits to be
X1(0) = N −X25(0). (4.5)
Calculating the initial conditions in this way guarantees that as long as P and N
are input as integers, each compartment begins with an integer number of people.
4.2.2 Stochastic Transitions
As stated above, all transitions relating to disease progression, death, and
recovery can be modeled with binomial random variables. In the MedKits model,
the expected number for each transition is defined to be the number of people in the
compartment multiplied by the probability of the transition. In general, we change
each of these to a binomial random variable with parameters n equal to Xi(t) and
p equal to the transition probability. However, there are a few issues that need to
be considered.
There are some transitions in the model which move people from the same
compartment into two other compartments. For example, from compartment 13
(people in the prodromal stage receiving treatment) a person could transition to
either compartment 17 (recovery) or compartment 14 (fulminant). Each of these
transitions should be modeled with a binomial random variable. Each of these
random variables will be a number between 0 and Xi(t). This leads to the possibility
that the sum of the two transitions could be greater than Xi(t). This means there
are fewer people in compartment 13 than we are attempting to move.
To address this issue, we use a two-stage calculation method. For each com-
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partment with more than one transition from it, we first calculate the number of
people who will leave the compartment for all transitions. We then calculate the
number of those transitions that will be of each type. Consider the following exam-
ple. We denote a binomial random variable with parameters n and p as described
by B(n, p). The number of people in compartment 13 at time t is X13(t). People
in compartment 13 move to compartment 14 with probability 1/122.4 and to com-
partment 17 with probability 1/21.7. We calculate the number of people that will
move out of compartment 13 (M13(t)) due to either transition at time t as
M13(t) = B(X13(t), 1/122.4 + 1/21.7). (4.6)
We generate a second binomial random variable to determine how many of these





We then calculate the number of transitions to compartment 17 as the difference
between M13(t) and φ13.14(t). This process preserves the distributions of transitions
while preventing the rare case in which the sum exceeds the number of people avail-
able to transition. A similar result could be obtained by calculating a multinomial
random variable with a probability vector containing the probabilities of all the pos-
sible transitions as well as the probability of remaining in the initial compartment.
For the transitions from prodromal to fulminant that depend on length of time
in the prodromal stage, it is not possible to correctly represent two populations with
two different rates of transition as a single binomial random variable. So instead, we
separate each calculation into two random variables. Consider compartment 2. We
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estimate the number of people in the compartment that have entered within the last
72 hours, N2(t), by taking the minimum of the number in the compartment and the
number counted in the last 72 hours (count2(t)). We calculate the number of these
people who will move as B(N2(t), γ). The number of people in the compartment
who have been there for more than 72 hours is X2(t)−N2(t). The number of these
who will transition is B(X2(t)−N2(t), η). The total number of transitions φ2,3(t) is
the sum of these two random variables.
The following is a list of all of the transitions related to disease progression,
recovery and death in the simulation model. For i = 1, 4, 7, and 25,
φi,i+1(t) = B(Xi(t), p(t)). (4.8)
For i = 2, 5, and 26,
Ni(t) = min{Xi(t), counti(t)}, (4.9)
φi,i+1(t) = B(Ni(t), γ) +B(Xi(t)−Ni(t), η). (4.10)
For (i, j) pairs (8, 10), (9, 11), and (13, 14),
Mi(t) = B(Xi(t), 1/122.4 + 1/21.7), (4.11)
φi,j(t) = B(Mi(t), (1/122.4)/(1/122.4 + 1/21.7)), (4.12)
φi,17(t) = Mi(t)− φi,j(t). (4.13)
For i = 14 and 15,
Mi(t) = B(Xi(t), 1/720 + 1/24), (4.14)
φi,17(t) = B(Mi(t), (1/720)/(1/720 + 1/24)), (4.15)
φi,22(t) = Mi(t)− φi,17(t). (4.16)
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For i = 16,
M16(t) = B(X16(t), 1/720 + 1/38.4), (4.17)
φ16,17(t) = B(M16(t), (1/720)/(1/720 + 1/38.4)), (4.18)
φ16,22(t) = M16(t)− φ16,17(t). (4.19)
For i = 3, 6, 10, 11, and 27,
φi,22(t) = B(Xi(t), 1/26.4). (4.20)
And for i = 12,
φ12,22(t) = B(X12, 1/38.4). (4.21)
For each iteration of the simulation, the model generates values from all of
the transition equations φij(t) and then generates the intermediate values Yi(t) as
in the MedKits model using equation 3.11.
4.2.3 Prophylaxis and Treatment Transitions
The transitions based on awareness can be calculated with the same binomial
random variable technique. We calculate transitions for the compartment pairs
(2, 5), (3, 6), (26, 9), (27, 12), (1, 4), (19, 20), and (23, 24) using B(n, p) where n is
the number in the compartment and p is the probability of becoming aware.
For the transition from compartment 25 to awareness (when we make the
decision of adherence to prophylaxis), we use a two-stage calculation similar to the
one described above. We calculate the number that will move from compartment 25
based on the probability of awareness, 1/72, as M25(t) = B(Y25(t), 1/72). Then we
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calculate a second random variable with probability α that they adhere and move
to compartment 28, ψ25,28(t) = B(M25(t), α). The number moved to compartment
7 is the difference between M25(t) and ψ25,28(t).
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the transitions to prophylaxis and
treatment are not random but controlled by the availability of medication and sup-
plies. It would be inappropriate to model these transitions with binomial random
variables. However, because people transition from these compartments into other
compartments where transitions are determined by binomial random variables, it is
important that we ensure that these transitions are all integers. This also makes
sense in the real scenario since there is not a situation where half a person could
move into treatment.
The way we handle this issue is as follows. First we calculate those moving
to treatment. The treatment capacity, CT (t), and the probability of being treated
from any individual compartment, π(t), are the same as in the MedKits model.
We find an initial number to move from each compartment i by taking the floor
of Yi(t)π(t). Because there are seven compartments from which people can move
into treatment (5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12) and we took a floor function for each,
we could have enough capacity to move up to six more people into treatment (de-
pending on how large the remainder was for each floor function). To divide up
this remaining capacity we iterate until the number moved is the largest integer
less than CT (t). Each time we use a multinomial random variable to choose one
of the seven compartments to draw another person from (first checking that that
compartment has another person available). This ensures that we do not move more
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people from a compartment than are in that compartment. It also maintains integer
numbers of people in all compartments while still distributing treatment across the
compartments approximately according to π(t).
We follow the same procedure for calculating the number who will move into
prophylaxis. There are four compartments (4, 5, 6, and 20) containing people wait-
ing for prophylaxis. We first subtract the number that moved into treatment from
compartments 5 and 6. We calculate the capacity, CP (t), and probability of mov-
ing into prophylaxis, ρ(t), as in the MedKits model. We then calculate the initial
transitions using the floor function of Yi(t)ρ(t), and then distribute any additional
prophylaxis randomly among the four compartments. As for compartment 25, once
we calculate the number moving from compartment 4 into prophylaxis we use a bi-
nomial random variable to determine the number moving to compartments 28 and
7.
At each iteration of the model, we generate values for the transitions using the





We conduct a number of computational experiments with the following goals
in mind. First, we aim to show that the MedKits model is a useful tool for predict-
ing the impact of distributing MedKits before an attack. Second, we would like to
evaluate the accuracy of the MedKits model results by comparing them with the
results of the simulation model. The results in this chapter reflect specific scenarios
on which the model was tested. We attempt to model relevant changes to all im-
portant parameters. The model can, however, be used to model other scenarios as
needed.
5.1 MedKits Model
This section discusses results and observations related to the deterministic
MedKits model. All numbers are the expected numbers of deaths for specific sce-
narios.
5.1.1 Scenarios
We run the MedKits model using the set of scenarios described by Zaric et al.
[18]. Any of these assumptions can easily be changed to model different scenarios.
We assume a population size of 5,000,000 people. We consider three sizes of attacks
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in which 50,000, 500,000, and 1,250,000 people are exposed. We consider three
possible values for β (the fraction of people who believe they are exposed but are
not). These β values are 0.01, 0.1, and 0.5. Different sources cite both 90% and
65% prophylaxis adherence rates, so we consider both. We also consider push pack
arrival either 12 hours or 24 hours after time of detection (Zaric et al. [18] uses
both, though the CDC [7] states the push pack can be delivered anywhere in under
12 hours). We consider the number of MedKits distributed prior to an attack in 11
increments of 500,000 between 0 and 5,000,000. Zero MedKits corresponds closely
to the model of Zaric et al. [18], while 5,000,000 MedKits corresponds to the entire
population receiving MedKits prior to attack (though we still assume only 95% have
access to their MedKits, and the rest will need to go to a POD to receive prophylaxis
[8]). We test every combination of these parameters for a total of 396 scenarios.
5.1.2 Results
Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 give charts with the full results of these simulations. In



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The parameter α has a generally linear effect on the number of deaths. With a
lower adherence rate, more people are expected to die, but the difference is relatively
constant across the MedKit distribution. This is reasonable since adherence is not
at all dependent on where a person gets his prophylaxis.
The time lag until the push pack arrives affects the data as expected. More
people will die with a 24-hour delay than with a 12-hour delay. Higher MedKit
distribution does help to close this gap. For example, we consider the scenario in
which 1,250,000 people are exposed, α = 0.9, and β = 0.5. With no MedKits, the
expected number of deaths for t = 12 is 595,527 compared with 606,221 for t = 24,
a difference of 10,694 lives. With MedKits distributed to the entire population, the
number of deaths for t = 12 is 103,675 compared with 103,898 for t = 24. The
MedKits reduce the difference in deaths to just 223 lives. The reason for this result
is that with MedKits, most people do not have to wait for the push pack to arrive to
begin prophylaxis. They can begin as soon as they become aware of their exposure.
The small remaining difference in deaths can be attributed to the 5% of people who
are unable to use their MedKits and are therefore affected by the delay in the push
pack arrival.
Fig. 5.1 gives a graph showing trends in the data. In this graph, we consider
six of the scenarios. All were for α = 0.65 and t = 24 hours until the push pack
arrives. We consider the cases where N = 50, 000 and N = 1, 250, 000 for each of















































































infected that are expected to die. In every scenario, as the number of MedKits
increased, the deaths decreased.
The data makes it obvious that the number of people exposed is directly
related to the number of people expected to die. However, it also reveals that
with larger exposures, a larger fraction of those exposed will die if no MedKits
are distributed. For example, we compare the cases where N = 50, 000 and N =
1, 250, 000 with all other parameters equal (α = 0.9, β = 0.5, and t = 12). With
no MedKits, the percent of those exposed who die is 39.3% for the smaller exposure
compared with 47.6% for the larger exposure. However, with the whole population
receiving MedKits, the expected percentages are 8.210% and 8.294% respectively.
Distributing the MedKits makes the percentage difference almost imperceptible.
The fraction of those not exposed who believe the have been, β, seems to be the
parameter with the biggest effect on the results. When no MedKits are distributed,
larger values of β force significantly higher death percentages. For example, as
shown in Fig. 5.1, with α = 0.65, t = 24, and N = 1, 250, 000, the percentage of
those exposed who will die is 20.3% (253,854 people) with β = 0.01 compared to
49.8% (621,907 people) with β = 0.5 when no MedKits are distributed. This means
that more than twice as many people are expected to die in the same scenario, just
because a much larger number of people believe they were exposed. Distributing
MedKits to the entire population reduces these percentages to 11.220% and 11.229%
respectively (a difference of just 123 people). The MedKits have a drastic effect on
the outcome in this case.
In both of the above situations, the reason for the trends has to do with the
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queue for prophylaxis. Both larger exposures and larger groups who believe they
have been exposed cause larger numbers of people to seek prophylaxis. In the case
of larger β, many of these people that seek and receive prophylaxis do not actually
need it and could be taking it away from people who do need it. Because the supply
of prophylaxis is limited, especially early in the scenario, many people who need
prophylaxis are forced to wait for it. Beginning prophylaxis as early as possible
is key to survival, so when these people must wait, their risk of death increases
greatly. The greatest benefit of the MedKits is that most of the people who have
them can begin prophylaxis immediately upon becoming aware. They do not get in
the queue, and the queue remains small for the remaining people who do have to seek
this source of prophylaxis. As a result, distributing any number of MedKits reduces
the deaths, but distributing them to the entire population virtually eliminates the
differences in death percentages caused by exposure size or β size with all other
parameters equal.
The MedKits reduce the number of deaths in every scenario. They have the
largest effect on scenarios in which the number of people exposed or potentially
exposed is high. They also act as a defense against unexpected delays in prophylaxis
dispensing.
5.2 Simulation Model
The goal of the stochastic Simulation Model is to generate data which can
be compared to the MedKits model data to evaluate its accuracy. Because of the
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increased runtime from generating so many random variables, it is impractical to
test all 396 scenarios presented for the deterministic model. Instead we choose a
selection of scenarios that are representative of the whole collection. We run the
Simulation Model for the following nine scenarios. For all, we let α = 0.65, β = 0.1
and t = 12. We test each of the three values of N with M = 0, 2,500,000, and
5,000,000. For each scenario, we run 100 replications. We determine the average
number of deaths for the 100 replications of the scenario and compare this with the
deterministic result. Table 5.4 shows the results of this analysis.
The data in Table 5.4 shows that even when all transitions not based on
capacity are allowed to vary, there is very little change in the results. Seven of the
nine scenarios tested have the deterministic result fall within the 95% confidence
interval of the average result from the simulation model. Even for those in which the
deterministic result was not within this confidence interval, the percent difference
between the deterministic and average number of deaths is extremely small (the
largest percent difference being only about 1/3 of a percent). These results provide
confidence that the MedKits model can accurately predict the expected number of
deaths in an attack scenario.
The deterministic MedKits model is the more valuable model for decision-
making purposes. However, the simulation model adds credibility to the results of
the MedKits model. It shows that across a variety of scenarios, the MedKits model









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.3 Run Time Results
Both models were run in Matlab, version 2009a on a 2.8GHz Intel Pentium 4
processor with 512MB RAM and Fedora Core 5 operating system. For the MedKits
model, the time per run was relatively consistent over all scenarios with an average
time of 1.238 seconds. The simulation model was much slower due to the generation
of thousands of binomial random variables. The time per replication was directly
related to the number of people exposed. For the scenarios with 50,000 people
exposed, the average run time was approximately 14.7 seconds. For 500,000 exposed,
the time increased to an average of 26.8 seconds. And for 1,250,000 exposed, the
times averaged 49.4 seconds. The average times were slightly lower for the scenarios
with more MedKits distributed. Table 5.5 contains a summary of all the runtime
results.
Table 5.5: We show the runtime results for both models. The top portion shows
the number of seconds for a single run in each scenario calculated as the average
over the 100 runs of that scenario. The bottom portion shows the average number
of seconds for a single run of the MedKits model.
Averages over 100 Simulation Model Runs
M values
N values 0 2,500,000 5,000,000
50,000 15.118 14.594 14.319
500,000 27.835 26.343 26.124
1,250,000 54.489 47.743 46.073
Average over 396 MedKit Model scenarios
1.238
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While the simulation model can take hours to run enough replications to obtain
an average result, the deterministic model is very fast. Given a specific scenario, the
expected number of deaths can be calculated in a matter of seconds, making this





We have discussed two new compartmental models to simulate anthrax attacks.
The first is based on the model developed by Zaric et al. [18]. It has significant
changes that clarify aspects of the original model and extend it to consider the effect
of distributing MedKits prior to attack on the expected number of deaths. The
model contains 28 compartments representing various disease and treatment stages.
Transitions between the compartments are calculated deterministically based on
probabilities of progressing (for disease stages, recovery, death, and awareness) and
capacity (for prophylaxis and treatment).
We ran the model on a variety of attack scenarios, and showed that in every
case, distributing more MedKits prior to an attack reduces the expected number
of people who die. We saw that the number of people exposed and the number
of unexposed people who believe they were have the largest affect on the number
of deaths. When these numbers are large, the number of deaths, as well as the
percentage of those exposed who die are both larger. Distributing MedKits to
the entire population minimizes the effects of these parameters. With all other
parameters the same, a scenario with a small number exposed and a scenario with
large number exposed have large differences in percent of exposed who die without
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MedKits, but when MedKits are distributed to the whole population, the percent
who die is almost identical between the scenarios. A similar result occurs in like
scenarios where β is varied. The most valuable benefit of MedKits seems to be
that they reduce the competition for prophylaxis. They remove people from the
prophylaxis queue, making that medication available to others who need it.
These results show that MedKits are always effective in reducing the number
of deaths in an anthrax attack, but the impact is amplified in situations where large
numbers of people are exposed or believe they are. Further research may show that
MedKits are particularly desirable in large cities, where both these parameters are
likely to be high and the competition for prophylaxis will be greater.
The second model is used to verify that the MedKits model results are accu-
rate. This model considers stochastic transition equations rather than the determin-
istic probability based transitions of the MedKits model. We model the transitions
relating to disease progression, recovery, death, and awareness using binomial ran-
dom variables. We reformulate the initial conditions as well as the prophylaxis and
treatment transitions to ensure that every compartment always contains an integer
number of people (a requirement for the binomial random variable).
We ran this model over a selection of the scenarios used for the MedKits model.
We used 100 replications for each scenario and calculated the average number of
deaths. Analysis showed that in every case the deterministic result yielded by the
MedKits model was very close to the average from the simulation model. In seven
of the nine scenarios tested, the deterministic result was within a 95% confidence
interval around the average result, and in all of the cases the percent difference
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between the two was less than 1/2 of a percent.
The MedKits model runs very quickly, allowing the results of a scenario to be
calculated in just seconds. The simulation model is much slower, but we were able
to use it to gather results verifying the MedKits results.
The MedKits model is limited by the accuracy of the input parameters. In
particular, it is difficult to be certain how many people are infected in an attack
because those that never leave the incubation stage appear the same as those who
are not infected. At best, the parameters N and β are estimates based on the current
available data. Also, we consider two prophylaxis adherence rates, 65% and 90%,
but is difficult to predict what the actual adherence rate will be as it depends on
the individuals in the population. Obviously the more precise the scenario and the
flow variables are, the more accurate the result will be. The model is designed in
such a way that new data about disease progression assumptions or other scenarios
could easily be incorporated.
From these results, we conclude that the MedKits model is a good approx-
imation of what happens in an anthrax attack and can be trusted as a source of
estimated deaths. Local governments can be confident that, assuming input param-
eters are chosen carefully, the MedKits model will give reliable results quickly.
6.2 Contributions
The main contribution of this model is the integration of both disease progres-
sion and emergency logistics. The original model [18] does this, and the MedKits
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model extends it to include another element of emergency preparedness. The model
could be extended further to consider other aspects as well. Although both com-
partmental models and simulation models have been used to model anthrax attack
response logistics, we believe this to be the first use of stochastic simulation to
enhance a compartmental model in this setting.
The model provides a good balance of detail with simplicity. The compart-
mental design makes the model intuitive while still allowing the many intricacies of
attack scenarios to be modeled. This allows the model to be accessible to public
officials that may not have a rigorous mathematical modeling background, but still
incorporates enough detail to make it useful. The model does make some assump-
tions that are more simplistic than the situation being modeled (e.g. making the
number infected an input parameter rather than using a diffusion model to deter-
mine who would be affected by a specific point source attack). However it is designed
in such a way that more complexity can be added if desired without redesigning the
entire model.
The model gives national, state, and local public health officials a tool to eval-
uate plans for implementing MedKit distribution into emergency planning. While
officials still need to carry out their own investigations and cost evaluations, this
gives them a source of data about the effects of the MedKits in particular scenarios.
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6.3 Future Work
There are several clear extensions to this work. One of the goals of the model is
to aid local governments in making decisions about whether to distribute MedKits
in their communities. The model shows the benefits of MedKit distribution, but
another big aspect of the decision making process is the cost. This is something
that varies by community based on its size and its plans to pay for the MedKits, so
we leave the cost analysis to individual jurisdictions. Some things that would need
to be included in the decision is how to handle expiration dates of the medication
as well as the fear that people would take the pills without being told and develop
resistance to them. Bicknell discusses these kinds of issues [2].
Another consideration in developing a response plan is the public’s attitude.
Studies have been carried out to evaluate such public perceptions. Rincuiuso-
Hasslemann et al. [14] discuss a series of surveys conducted in New York to evaluate
the public’s opinions about various response measures. Thoughts are presented on
how to increase the prophylaxis adherence rate. The CDC’s study of MedKit distri-
bution [8] included a survey of participants’ opinions about MedKits. In that study,
94% of participants said they would like to have MedKits in their homes.
For the models in this report, we assumed most of the parameters to be con-
stant. For example, we assumed a constant adherence rate throughout the model,
but it could be easily adjusted to incorporate α changing over time. Also, the time
of detection is fixed at t = 48 hours after attack. However, an attack is typically dis-
covered only when a person becomes ill. To make the model more realistic, the time
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of detection could be determined by considering transitions to the prodromal stage.
The BioSense system has been developed to track outpatient visits, prescriptions
and laboratory orders with an eye toward detecting attacks as early as possible [6].
Including this system in the model would lead to dynamic detection time simulation.
For the simulation model we varied the transitions. Another logical simulation
would be to vary the arrival times of the push pack and VMI. For example, we
consider two possibilities for arrival time of the push pack (12 and 24 hours), however
[7] states that the push pack can be delivered within 12 hours. So there is some
probability that it could arrive in under 12 hours depending on the distance it has
to travel, traffic, and other unpredictable factors. Because time is a huge factor in
preventing deaths, simulation of these time variations would be of great interest.
The MedKits model could be integrated with a dispersion model for the spread
of spores [6, 16]. This dispersion model could include weather data as well as pop-
ulation density in different areas to determine the likely number of people infected.
This would allow for health officials to determine the likely results of an attack in
a specific location without having to do their own study of how many people would
be affected to determine an input number of infected individuals.
While the MedKits model is specifically designed to model an anthrax at-
tack, it could be adjusted to model different noncommunicable diseases. With more
elaborate changes, the model could be made to reflect endemic diseases as well.
Obviously the possibilities for further advances are endless. As new emergency
plans are developed they will need to be modeled and evaluated. The model we have
developed provides a stand-alone tool for health officials to use in evaluating their
71
own emergency preparedness plans and hopefully provides enough flexibility to be
integrated with other models as needed in the future.
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